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Abstract—PROFINET is a widely adopted, real-time capable
Industrial Ethernet standard, that as other automation system
technologies, is subject to an increasing level of vertical integra-
tion into company’s existing IT infrastructure. This integration
exposes automation systems to well-known cyber attacks, which
leads to a growing need for suitable security solutions. The chal-
lenge in protecting PROFINET automation systems is ensuring
the suitability of solutions for use with minimal PROFINET cycle
times of 250 µs needed to fulfill high-speed motion control market
expectations. We develop a prototype of a transparent security
switch, designed to apply protection mechanisms on-the-fly. We
use this platform to test an initial implementation of a protection
system, present preliminary results and further work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Introducing Ethernet-based fieldbus protocols as, e.g.,
PROFINET IO1, into industrial control systems has led to
an increase in performance and efficiency but also opened
the system for potential cyber attackers, which are now able
to perform similar attacks well-known from the office IT
environment. Contrarily, the consequences of security weak-
nesses in automation systems are completely different to
them in a company’s office network. Denial-of-service attacks
causing system downtimes can lead to enormous financial
damage e.g., the production of rejects or physical damage
to the installation. A possible countermeasure to such attacks
explicitly targeting automation systems is integrity protection,
i.e., ensuring the message could not be maliciously modified
during transmission. Also, services to verify the authenticity
of a message are needed to make sure only messages from
known and trusted communication partners will be processed.
Both of these objectives can be met by including a so-called
message authentication code (MAC), subsequently referred by
integrity check value (ICV) to avoid confusion with the term
media access control in networking terminology, calculated
over and appended to the packet. The calculation of such an
ICV comes with a significant performance overhead, highly
dependent on implementation and platform. This overhead
needs to be elaborated precisely in the context of real-time
(RT) and particularly isochronous real-time (IRT) transmission
in PROFINET systems with low cycle times. Considering
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motion control applications, we explore the possible impact on
high-performance PROFINET systems due to time needed for
cryptographic processing as well as the transmission overhead
of RT frames extended with protocol fields for security.
Security in PROFINET has already been explored within
the scope of a German research project. Besides concepts for
platform integrity, key distribution and a public key infrastruc-
ture [1], [2], the performance of symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms for confidentiality (encryption) as
well as of hash- and block cipher based message authentication
codes [3], [4] was evaluated. These results, collected in a final
report [5], were rated according to a working assumption of
a PROFINET systems with a configured cycle time of 1 ms.
While this assumption may be correct for a wide range of
general PROFINET systems, for motion control applications
it is not. A body of work on optimizing PROFINET IRT for
fast cycle times [6] states typical system boundaries of such
applications: 8 to 256 Bytes payload and 250 µs cycle time
with a 50:50 real-time to non-real-time traffic duty cycle.
The challenges on finding suitable solutions for protecting
PROFINET and general real-time Ethernet automation systems
as well as corresponding requirements were investigated in [7],
In Section II we elaborate the performance overhead pro-
duced by additional protocol fields for protecting PROFINET
real-time traffic as well as a brief theoretical background on
proposed cryptographic building blocks. Section III describes
the ongoing work of the prototypal implementation of a
security switch. This switch serves as platform to evaluate
performance and shall also represent a base for a device that
can be used for verification and validation by device vendors
implementing security mechanisms according to a prospective
standard. Section IV summarizes and concludes our work in
progress and depicts further work planned on this subjet.
II. SECURITY PROTOCOL EXTENSION: PROPOSAL AND
PERFORMANCE IMPACT ANALYSIS
A. Cryptographic Building Blocks
Encryption of the complete message payload to prevent
eavesdropping on process data produces a significant perfor-
mance overhead, especially on resource constraint embedded
devices, what applies to most of PROFINET IO-Devices but
also to some of the IO-Controllers. In this paper we therefore
focus on solutions to protect the integrity of PROFINET real-
time traffic, i.e., an integrity checksum, taking a secret key
shared between both communicating parties as input param-
eter, calculated over the message payload and transmitted
together with the original message. The HMAC algorithm
is a well fitting candidate for generating such an ICV. It is
designed for the usage with any cryptographic hash algorithm,
a one-way function applied on an input of arbitrary length
producing an output of fixed length.
a) HMAC:Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code:
HMAC is a simple mechanism to use cryptographic hash func-
tions for message authentication. According to its definition
in RFC 2104 [8], it is designed to be used with any available
cryptographic hash function H without modification but easy
replaceability. Authenticity is ensured by a shared secret key
k provided as input parameter to the HMAC amongst the
actual message. The key k is padded with zero bits up to
the number of bits b of the underlying hash function. If the
length of the originally negotiated key is greater than b, the
key will be hashed once with the same hash function H as
used for the inner and outer hash execution. To omit usage of
the same derived key k twice within one HMAC execution,
it is XORed once with the inner padding block ipad (0x36
repeated for block length b) and once with the outer pad opad
(0x5C repeated for block length b). Both XOR (⊕) operations
result in flipping another set of half of the bits in k. The inner
hash function gets the message concatenated (||) to the key k
XORed to the inner padding block ipad as input. Its output
then is appended to the result of k XORed with opad Eq. 1 [9,
pp. 88-91].
HMAC(k,m) = H
[
(k ⊕ opad)||H[(k ⊕ ipad)||m]] (1)
The size of the output of the HMAC function is the same
as of the underlying hash function H , although this can be
truncated. To still meet an adequate level of security, the
minimal length of the truncated output is limited to half of the
hash output size and shall not be less than 80 bits (compare
to Section 5 in [8]). Considering a minimal impact on the
performance, truncation shall be taken into account when
protecting PROFINET real-time traffic.
b) SHA-3: Secure Hash Algorithm 3: SHA-3 is chosen as
candidate to be used as cryptographic hash function in HMAC.
Under the name Keccak, this algorithm was selected as the
winner of the NIST2 hash function competition and therefore
standardized as SHA-3 in the FIPS3 Publication 202 [10].
SHA-3 is based on a completely different mathematical struc-
ture as its predecessors SHA-2 and SHA-1. SHA-1 is known
to be vulnerable against collision attacks and is therefore not
recommended to be used in new designs [11]. Although these
weaknesses do not affect the security of SHA-2 to the present
date, emerging issues can be expected in the future since it
shares the mathematical structure of SHA-1. Especially in the
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automation systems environment, where devices are designed
for long-term operation and will not be updated or rather
replaced frequently, we therefore recommend to choose SHA-
3. SHA-3 is standardized for four different output sizes, 224,
256, 384 and 512 bits (detailed description of mathematical
operations of SHA-3 in [10]).
The ICV relies on a shared secret, whose presence is
assumed as given in a first iteration. The establishment of this
key material is out of scope of this publication.
B. Protocol Fields
For high-performance isochronous real-time transmission in
PROFINET, the real-time protocol RTC3 (Real-Time-Class
3) is used, which enables cycle times in the sub millisecond
domain. To achieve this a special switch hardware is required
[12, p. 49]. The RTC3 protocol consists of the following fields,
encapsulated as payload in a standard 802.3 Ethernet frame:
(1) FrameID (2 bytes); (2) RT payload (padded up to min.
40 bytes); (3) the ADPU (Application Protocol Data Unit)
represented by the Cycle Counter (2 bytes), Data Status and
Transfer Status (1 byte each) [13, pp. 100-101] [12, pp. 62-66].
The minimum size of an Ethernet frame is defined by
64 Bytes, including header fields as source and destination
MAC addresses, Ethertype (0x8892 for PROFINET) and
FCS (frame check sequence, a 4 byte cyclic redundancy
checksum). In RTC3, there is no VLAN Tag needed since
prioritization is handled with configured duty cycles [12, p.
66]. Therefore, available IO data payload is 40 bytes. These
fields must now be extended by the fields to ensure protection.
To minimize the transmission overhead on the wire, only
important fields of minimal size shall be added. Starting with
the necessary ICV, we can choose a HMAC with SHA3-224,
truncated to half of its output (14 bytes) to have a minimal
sized protocol field providing sufficient security. To prevent
replay attacks, i.e., the malicious retransmission of an already
sent packet, a sequence counter is needed. The PROFINET
RTC cycle counter represents the relative transmission time
in multiples of 31.25 µs. This may appear to fulfill the
functionality of a sequence, unfortunately, the cycle counter
is only 2 bytes long, which results in an overflow every
216 · 31.25 µs = 2.048 s ∼ 2 s. For this reason, an extension
of the cycle counter has to be introduced within the security
fields consisting of 2 additional bytes, incremented on every
overflow of the PROFINET cycle counter. Otherwise, keys
would have to be refreshed each 2 seconds to still be able
to prevent replay attacks. The additional 2 bytes extends the
expiration period to 216 ·2.048 s ≈ 37.3 h ∼ 1.5 d. Performing
a renegotiation of keys every day is feasible, what could be
scheduled to times of low utilization (e.g., at midnight) to
ensure that the system will never be disturbed in its normal
operation. Nevertheless, it also needs to be ensured that the
establishment of a new key can never interfere the cyclic
data exchange. Therefore, the key negotiation needs to be
scheduled to be performed before expiration of the actual
key, i.e., at each time of operation, there needs to be at least
one new key available to replace the current. This leads to
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Fig. 1. PROFINET IRT frame scheduling in IO-Controller.
the introduction of another mandatory field: An identifier
which key context is applied to the currently processed frame.
Again, to keep the overhead as small as possible, this field
can consist of a single byte. Assuming a key refreshment
cycle of one day, this identifier overflows every 256 days. We
presume that it will be never necessary to keep more than 256
key contexts available within one connection. All these fields
collected result in a security overhead of 17 bytes. This will
be our working assumption for the following calculations.
C. Performance Considerations
To analyze the performance, we defined the following
system boundaries corresponding to a worst case configuration
(i.e., upper limit of IO data payload) of a motion control
system running PROFINET IRT:
• Cycle time: 250 µs, 125 µs reserved for RT traffic and
125 µs open for NRT traffic (50:50 duty cycle).
• IO data payload size: 256 byte.
• Ethernet bandwidth: 100Mbit/s, full-duplex.
• Wire length between two network devices: 100 m.
• Switching delay: 1.5 µs [6].
The minimum time of 125 µs open for non-real-time traffic
originates from 123 µs transmission time for a maximum sized
Ethernet frame of 1538 bytes on the wire (1500 bytes payload,
18 bytes header as described in Section II-B and 20 bytes
for preamble, start of frame delimiter and interframe gap),
which is 123 µs in 100Mbit/s Ethernet. A RTC3 frame with
256 bytes payload results in a frame of 300 bytes that will be
transmitted within 24 µs. Without security extensions, 5 such
frames could be transmitted within the reserved RT bandwidth,
but the defined 17 bytes of additional protocol fields produce
a transmission overhead of 1.4 µs (Eq. 2). This leads to a
physical limitation of 4 RTC3 motion control frames to be
transmitted within 125 µs (Eq. 3).
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Fig. 2. PROFINET IRT task scheduling in IO-Controller: RT frame processing
(task 1), cryptographic protection of frames (task 2), non-real-time frame
processing (task 3) and CPU idle time (task 4).
Execution Time by RT Payload Size [µs]
Task (Average over N=1000 Iterations)
8 Bytes 256 Bytes
SHA-3-224 14.53 26.02
HMAC-SHA-3-224 19.27 28.41
RT Frame Processing 0.23 0.54
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS OF PURE SHA-3 AND HMAC-SHA-3
(224-BIT VERSIONS) IMPLEMENTATIONS AND THE RT FRAME
PROCESSING OVERHEAD ON INTEL CORE I7 (3.4 GHZ).
(17 ∗ 8)bits
100 ∗ 106 bitss
= 1.36 µs ≈ 1.4 µs (2)
⌊
125 µs
(24 µs + 1.4 µs)
⌋
= 4 (3)
The scheduling of an IO-Controller serving 4 IO-Devices
with one RTC3 frame per cycle can be seen in Fig. 1. The first
frame to be sent targets the furthermost IO-Device, because in
addition to its switch it has to pass the 3 intermediate switches
(1.5 µs delay) and 4 line delays of 0.5 µs [13, p. 113].
Each frame transmitted by the IO-Controller must be pro-
cessed within the stack preliminary. Subsequently, the crypto-
graphic protection of the frame is performed. The same tasks
needs to be applied in reverse order for the received frames
of each IO-Device, i.e., the integrity needs to be verified
before the frame can be processed further. This leads to a
critical path of 8 times the processing time of cryptographic
protection tC (assuming a symmetric setup, i.e., IO-Devices
are configured to provide and consume one frame within
every cycle) and 2 times the needed RT frame processing
time within the PROFINET stack tRT , having both tasks
implemented to run independently. Additionally, some time
to process non-real-time application tasks (tNRT ) and CPU
idle time (tI ) is scheduled (Fig. 2). A proof of concept
implementation of a PROFINET RT protection routine on a
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Fig. 3. PROFINET Security switch architecture.
workstation machine (intel Core i7, 3.4 GHz) delivers some
reference values for high-performance platforms for further
estimations: tRT = 0.54 µs and tC = 28.41 µs (see Table I).
Using these values, 21.64 µs remain for non critical tasks
(tNRT + tI ) besides the high priority RT processing (Eq. 4).
250 µs− 8 · tC − 2 · tRT = 21.64 µs = tNRT + tI (4)
III. SECURITY SWITCH ARCHITECTURE
To keep the effort for integration of security mechanisms
into PROFINET devices as low as possible, the processes for
testing and verification of implementations shall be applied
equally by different device and stack vendors. For this purpose,
a transparent switch that is capable to manage a secure com-
munication relationship between a legacy, security-unaware
IO-Controller and an IO-Device with security extensions, was
designed (Fig. 3). The transparent switch is based on an in-
dustry proven three-port switch optimized for PROFINET IRT
communication supporting intelligent, dynamic traffic filtering
and fast frame forwarding [6]. NRT frames will be forwarded
as usual, while RT frames are passed on to PROFINET RT pro-
tection application within the CPU, where they are converted
to protected frames by adding the necessary field (as described
in Section II-B), or vice-versa (i.e., verification of integrity
and back-conversion to standard RT frame). This security
switch is implemented on a standard FPGA development board
(Xilinx Zynq-7000 with ARM Cortex-A9 processing system),
which provides an optimal platform for performance evalu-
ation of an initial implementation of protection mechanisms
for PROFINET RT (this includes IRT) communication, both
purely software-based and hardware accelerated.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
Focusing on integrity and ensuring authenticity, we propose
a scheme for the protection of PROFINET RT traffic based on
HMAC-SHA-3, producing a protocol overhead of 17 bytes in
total. With a proof of concept implementation of the protection
mechanisms we can show that it is theoretically feasible to
provide security for high-performance motion control systems,
even if the transmission of the additional fields limits the
maximum number of IO-Devices to be served by an IO-
Controller within the 125 µs bandwidth for RT traffic to 4.
A concept for a transparent switch as inline unit for managing
a secure channel between security-aware and unaware devices,
is presented. This prototype is used to analyze the performance
of the proposed solution and shall provide a base platform for
a generic, vendor independent security testing and verification
device. Amongst the state-of-the art process of outsourcing
cryptographic algorithms into FPGA fabric, approaches to
apply hardware acceleration to protocol functionality will be
analyzed. Using profiling techniques, the system bottleneck
can be identified and the potential for optimizations can
be evaluated. Also, a statement about actual time left for
protection mechanisms and if around 22 µs is enough time for
execution of other, not real-time relevant tasks can be made
thereof. Further investigations on optimization during compile
time will be performed to elaborate the suitability of purely
software-based solutions for high-performance applications.
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